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1. Introduction  
The term Constitutionalism has no clear definition. It is used in multiple 
connotations and it is so general that invokes arguments for all of its aspects. The 
constitutionalism expresses the necessity of limiting the state powers by means of 
the law. It is a conviction that no government should have unlimited power to do 
whatever it wants, because every government can relapse into arbitrary rule, unless 
precautions are being taken”1.  
Hereby, two basic aspects of constitutionalism can be underlined: 
1. The first aspect concerns the formal constitutionalism - refers to the organi-
sational function of constitutionalism. “Power is proscribed and procedures 
prescribed”.  
2. The substantial aspect of constitutionalism - refers to the idea of protection of 
individual rights and freedoms from governmental actions and interference. 
Treneska- Deskoska stresses that “the term traditionally means limited authority 
and is defined as a system of legal limitations of the state power”. Its opposite is 
arbitrary, absolutist, authoritarian or totalitarian government2. The 
constitutionalism is a doctrine which governs the legitimacy of the government 
action. It is a concept of conformity of actions not only with the written or un-
written constitution, but more important, conformity with the broad philosophical 
values within the state. Hilaire Barnett emphasizes that the doctrine of 
constitutionalism suggests the following: 
a) That the exercise of powers should be within the legal limits and those who 
exercise the powers should be accountable to law, 
b) That the exercise of powers must conform to the notion of respect for individual 
and individual citizens rights, 
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c) That the powers conferred on institutions within the state - whether legislative, 
executive or judicial - be sufficiently disperse between the various institutions 
so as to avoid the abuse of power. 
d) That the government, in formulating policy and the legislature, in legitimating 
that policy, are accountable to the electorate on whose trust power is held3. 
The Constitutionalism is an ideal and ideology for limited and controlled 
government. The way to reach this ideal are the legal mechanisms, means and 
instruments which limit the power. Hereby, to understand to constitutionalism you 
should embrace all its elements. Treneska determines that there are many 
definitions for the term constitutionalism, but its substance may be described 
through the following elements: 
 
a) Separation of powers (separation between different branches of the 
government and separation between different levels of authority) 
b) Consent of the governed.  
c) Existence of higher law” (collection and system of written and unwritten of 
rules regulating the government in the state 
d) Protection of human rights 
e) Rule of law4. 
 
To summarize, it is very difficult to isolate and point to only one definition of the 
term constitutionalism. The term is multilayered and its true meaning can be 
perceived only if all the above mentioned elements are being analysed.  
 
1. The Principle of Separation of Powers as an Element of Constitutionalism  
People have one serious enemy – their government, Saint Just 
The government must be limited! The constitutionalism, as a request to limit the 
government by the way of legal means, achieves this through the human rights 
principle – as external principle and the principle of separation of powers – as 
internal principle.  
The principle of separation of powers is a basic idea, general objective and a 
constant of the modern legal order. The principle of separation of powers which 
actually means that the legislative, executive and judicial power must be separated, 
is in service of another higher idea, i.e. disabling the arbitrariness of the 
government, obstruction of the unwanted concentration and misuse of powers, and 
finally and most importantly – preserving and securing the personal freedom of the 
individual.  
In the constitutional literature the new situation in the relations between the 
branches of the government and the adaptation of the principle of separation of 
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powers to the new circumstances, is known as contemporary constitutionalism. The 
“tectonic” shift of the focus of decision making towards the legislative – executive 
– judicial power, and the unhidden and manifested will, ambition and activity of 
the courts to control the action of political authorities is its feature. So, although it 
has been emphasised that “to appoint the judges to be last and ultimate arbiter of all 
constitutional matters, as an extremely dangerous doctrine which may lead to 
despotism and oligarchy”, the final conclusion is that the judicial supremacy is the 
new form of control of the constitutionality of the laws (judicial review).  
The principle of separation of powers should not be absolute since it experiences a 
kind of evolution in the modern country. It seems that the principle of separation of 
powers modelled according to the ideas of Locke and Montesquieu was not 
immune to the modern trends of the constitutionalism. The feeling that the 
principle loses its romantic and authentic part, becomes stronger. It seems that the 
trends of equipoise of the executive power according to the will of the citizens 
transposed into the legislator are more and more oriented towards the constitutional 
courts. Today the fear of “new separation of powers” as a doctrine that provides 
possibility for secure positioning of the courts in the process of policy creation, is 
more justifiable.  
3.Judicial Supremacy and Judicial Paramontcy, Elements of Modern 
Constitutionalism or Symbol of the Pathology of ,,The New Separation of 
Powers”  
In terms of the Kelsen’s (Austrian) model of control of constitutionality of acts, it 
seems that the dilemma of the incompatibility of the control of the constitutionality 
by the constitutional court with the principle of separation of powers does not exist 
at all. Namely, if we take into account that the constitutional courts have clear 
constitutional position in the system of organisation of powers, which precisely 
separates them from the regular judiciary system, it seems that there is no violation 
of the above-mentioned principle. On the other hand, driven by the fact that the 
constitutional courts are not actual law makers and do not lay down the new rules 
of behaviour in the same way as the legislator, it can be concluded that this model 
of control of constitutionality removed the threat of direct intervention of the courts 
in the legislation area.  
All of the abovementioned refutes the arguments of the authors who, referring to 
the principle of separation of powers, criticise the control of the constitutionality by 
the constitutional courts. Thus, frequently emphasised view of Karl Schmitt that 
the above-mentioned principle implies restraint of the judicial power of any 
interference and meddling in the work of the legislator, is relativised with Hans 
Kelsen's argument according to which "the idea of separation of powers to different 
bodies is realised not so much for their mutual isolation, but for their mutual 
control” . In the context of the above-mentioned, there are also the claims that the 
constitutional courts competent to perform cassation of laws have their own 
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grounds and justification in the principle of separation of powers, disabling the 
horizontal concentration of powers.  
Unlike the Kelsen’s (European) model of control of the constitutionality, the USA 
model of control of constitutionality faced at the very beginning the dilemma of his 
relation with the principle of separation of powers. It seems that the American 
authors are not concerned by the constantly present views on the incompatibility of 
the control of the constitutionality with the principle of separation of powers, 
primarily modelled according to Locke and Montesquieu in the same manner as the 
possibility for appearance of the "new separation of powers". 
“The new separation of powers” is advocated by the resent constitutionalism, and 
the juristocracy and the court activism are its features. Namely, the historical facts 
that USA had periods when “the weakest” branch in the system of power 
simultaneously was the strongest court recorded in history will motivate the 
academic community to promote the modes and mechanisms for this condition to 
be avoided. This modern “pathology” of the system and efforts for its avoidance 
will become "academic obsession" of the 20th century in a certain manner.  
The American constitutionalists, especially contemporaries, still try to find most 
adequate modus by which they will justify the position of the Supreme Court of the 
United States in the system, in relation to its competence to refuse the application 
of the unconstitutional laws. Finally, the conclusions of Leonard W. Levy on “the 
question was there genuine and original intention for introducing control of 
constitutionality, as well as whether the court should have authorisation to interpret 
“mischievous” phrases of the Constitution, which will result in “judicial 
supremacy,” “judicial policy-making,” or “judicial legislation”, nowadays cause 
the literature for the Supreme Court of the United States to reflect the “raging bull” 
principle.5 
Namely, in its simplified form, the issue of judicial supremacy comes down to the 
question: Do the judges have legitimacy to decide on the constitutionality of the 
laws and Do the representatives of the citizens have the authorisation to adopt 
certain act with concrete contents which is not in compliance with the constitution, 
having in mind „we the people“ is a source of the political power. In this manner, 
trying to explain the mystical function of the Supreme Court of the United States, 
succeeded more from the political manoeuvring than the legal elaboration of the 
judgement Marbury v. Medison from 1803, A. Bickel states the anecdote about a 
French gentlemen who stated that it is great to breath in “the sweet air of 
legitimacy” at the port of New York, not knowing that what he breathes in is the 
breath of the Supreme Court of the United States6. Finally, as Graglia Lino 
concludes, regardless of whether it is about social political engineering or 
conservative judicial activism, the final effect is that the fundamental rights of the 
citizens are not decided by voting in the authority representing the will of the 
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citizens, but they depend on the beliefs and the result of the decision making by 
persons are not elected by the citizens7. 
The fear of idealising “the brave new world”, where the chronic commitment to 
the majority rule, conviction and belief that the majority will not violate the rights 
of the minority, the conviction that the citizens will demonstrate the behaviour 
capacity which will correct the made mistakes, encouraged Bickel and the modern 
constitutional-legal theory, to look for the exit of what has transferred the courts in 
the “top of the mountain” in the manners “to reconcile the judicial control of the 
constitutionality with the rule by the people, i.e. the will of the legislative body”. 
3.1 Theoretical Justification of the Judicial Supremacy Institute 
Although it is a stumbling block of the constitutionalism, today the judicial 
supremacy is a reality and generally accepted phenomenon. The American authors 
from A. Bickel, Ackermman, Tushnet, Crowe, Green to Lipkin have extremely 
critical view towards this “constitutional deviation”, however they accept it as 
existing, trying to find mechanisms through which the will of the citizens will be 
reflected in the court decisions. So “the judicial aristocracy” or “juristocracy”, 
unfamiliar phenomenon for most of the citizens, is the centre of the power whose 
decisions regarding the significance of the Constitution are being superior and are 
greater legal force that the decisions of the other branches of government directly 
elected by the citizens. The transformation of the self-government principle upon 
the rule of the elite, on the one hand, the rule of a group which has not been elected 
by the citizens, which is not responsible before any single entity, and judges with 
non-limited terms of office is final effect of this.  
However, although diagnosed as a “pathology of the system”, it seems that the US 
scientific community is not ready to propose fundamental changes in the system, so 
today the judicial supremacy, as a replacement for the judicial control of the 
constitutionality, is considered as the guardian of the Constitution, guardian of the 
individual rights and guardian of the rights of the minorities. These are basically 
the values of which no one wants to give up, no matter how much the ambition of 
the judicial power and its involvement in the political gaps is being criticised. The 
Constitutional literature in the USA leaves an impression that the judicial activism 
is the price which is willingly paid in order to keep the values which the 
constitution protects and is based on.  
Today, the science has several basic premises which are the starting point in the 
attempt to defend the need of judicial supremacy.  
The first premise is the claim that the Court is the guardian of the constitution, 
and the judges are portrayed as their promoters and protectors. The basis for the 
claim that the judges are the guardians of the constitution, with the task to set up 
the new directions and trends of system development, has its roots in the notions, 
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ideas and proposals of the “founding fathers”. The following perceptions are in the 
essence of this thesis: 
  the branches of the government elected by the citizens to adopt and apply 
laws with which the state policies should be implemented; 
  the laws must be in compliance with the constitution as highest law; 
 there must be a branch of the government which will take care for the respect 
of the principle of constitutional supremacy ; 
  independent judiciary as special branch of the government is designed to 
conduct the so-called protective role. 
  
In the context of the above-mentioned it must be emphasised that the “protective 
role of the judiciary is the core of the judicial supremacy”. It puts the Court in the 
centre of the constitutionalism in USA since it should protect the constitutional 
document and provide difference between the hierarchically higher and 
hierarchically subordinate act.  
If we begin from the assumption that the adopted law is always a result of 
negotiations and compromise and that in it essence it is a concentrated expression 
of risky political views, it is understandable that it cannot be expected from the 
legislation to take care principally of its constitutionality. Therefore, the court is 
assessed for the most adequate “constitutional stakeholder” which, when there is an 
issue about the constitutionality of the law, should make an assessment if the other 
branches of the government are within the frames of the established constitutional 
limits.  
However, although the basis of the so-called judicial supremacy as a replacement 
for judicial review is in the abovementioned thesis, the following questions remain: 
if the control of constitutionality of laws by all courts is the appropriate mechanism 
for protection of the constitution.  
The second premise for theoretical defence of the judicial supremacy is the need 
of protection of the rights and freedoms of the citizens. This premise is supported 
by the claim that only the court can decide whether the reached compromises in the 
legislative body translated into the adopted act violate the rights of the citizens. 
Namely, when the branches of the government, elected by the majority of citizens, 
are responsible for the interpretation of the constitutional norms, the rights and 
freedoms of citizens could be subject of constant violation because the individual 
rights are created to protect the individual against the thoughtlessness of the 
majority. Thus, the protection of the rights of the individual is a value to which it 
appears that the judiciary is traditionally inclined.  
The third premise which is given to finally draw a conclusion that the 
phenomenon of judicial supremacy is justifiable, even desirable, is the thesis that 
the independence and sovereignty of the judiciary per se is a democratic value 
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which only makes the judiciary an only option to conduct the control of the 
constitutionality of the laws. The given thesis is confirmed by a number of 
arguments: 
 
 The principle of separation of powers provides for independence of the 
judicial power from the other branches of the government, except when the 
Constitution itself makes an exception; 
 The lack of independent judiciary endangers the commitment of the principle 
of rule of law; 
 Finally, in order for the judges to say what is right and what is wrong, and to 
try to reach the justice as a value with their decisions, they must be 
independent when deciding. 
 
However, the abovementioned premise on the independent court function per se 
and in cumulation with the aforementioned is only a principle response to the 
question what entity could appear as a guardian of the constitution and the 
constitutional norms. It is not appropriate response to the question why the judges 
who are not elected by the citizens would be included in the political decision 
making and why should they openly manifest their ambition of co-legislator or 
third legislative body. 
 
3.2 The Principle of Separation of Powers and Alexander Bickel Theory of 
Prudence 
The American constitutionalism is characterised by pluralism of legal philosophies, 
and the abovementioned difference is also reflected on the judicial activism as 
component part of the American constitutionality. The concept of judicial 
supremacy and its contradiction with the principle of separation of powers is what 
causes the problem. Thus, the fact that the decisions of the Supreme Court, which 
are adopted by the judges not elected by the citizens, are additionally occurring the 
issue how much the institute of judicial control of the constitutionality corresponds 
to the traditional idea of separation of powers, from the aspect of limitation and the 
mutual control of all branches of the government. Therefore, it seems that the task 
of the constitutional and legal science becomes even more difficult, not only 
because it needs to explain the legal basis of the so-called judicial review, but also 
due to the fact that it should find a modus to settle the abovementioned institute 
with the principle of rule of people, i.e. the rule of the legislative body.  
The Bickel “theory on counter majoritarian difficulty“, based on Hamilton’s thesis 
“that compared to all state branches, the judiciary is the weakest branch“, is only 
one attempt to justify the Supreme Court as guardian of Constitution. The emphasis 
of the political function of the Supreme Court of United States has central position 
in Bickel’s theory of judicial surveillance on the work of the other functions of the 
government. The opportunity to conduct the constitutional audit makes the court to 
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act counter majoritarian. By establishing the unconstitutionality of the laws and 
other acts of the legislative and executive power, the Supreme Court opposes the 
will of citizens’ representatives in given historical moment, which ultimately means 
that it acts not on the behalf of the majority, but against its will. However, its 
“theory on counter majoritarian difficulty” finds its justification in the argument 
that the court has the role to act in the capacity of a promoter and guardian of the 
permanent values of the system. While the legislative and executive power are 
interested in preserving those values, and the focus of their interest is the 
“immediate benefit", the court has greater responsibility since it acts on a long-term 
basis. He looks for the exit of the counter majoritarian difficulty, for which he 
admits that it is not in compliance with the “heart of the democracy” in the 
protection of the permanent values or as he concludes “good society is not only the 
one that wants to meet the immediate need of the majority but the one that intends 
to be a mainstay of the permanent social values and their realisation“8. In this 
manner he admits that the role of the court, even when its decisions have not been 
in accordance with the will of the majority, is to protect the rights and the interests 
of the individuals which finally represents a permanent system value. Therefore, “if 
the Constitution is a symbol of the nation, its continuity, unity and common 
objective, the role of the court is to objectify that symbol”. However, all of the 
above-mentioned does not solve the dilemma and the tension for the relation of the 
court with the other branches. In the context of this conflict, Bickel emphasised 
that the solution should be looked in the "passive virtues" of the court and the need 
for self-restrain from the decision making without previous estimation of the 
concrete situation and all circumstances related to the case. As a variation of the 
self-restrain doctrine, the passive virtue essentially means restrain from the 
decision making in situations when the court estimates that the social conditions 
are not yet appropriate for its act. Therefore Antony T. Kronman states that “the 
most important element of the Bickel philosophy and the key to understanding of 
his entire opus is his belief in the value of the thoughtfulness and carefulness as 
political and judicial virtue“9. Although frequently criticised, and on the basis that 
it cannot be expected for the court to be asked to intervene only when its product is 
socially desirable, and especially due to the fear of the appearance of the “social 
imperialism”, it seems that the Bickel’s theory mobilised the academic community 
in USA to focus its study on the so-called “the new separation of powers”. 
The new separation of powers, as new condition in the relations between the 
branches of the government, essentially implies to a situation in which the courts 
determine or redefine the limits of actions by the other branches of government on 
the behalf of the constitutional principles. In this manner, Ackerman recognises that 
the system cannot be pictured without an institution that would perform the control 
of the constitutionality since its absence would “generate cynicism at the very 
thought the citizens to give them directions of taking actions to their 
representatives, and then to expect them not to meet them“. However, he will 
establish that the creation of such institution is not a simple task and that it is 
determined by cumulated sociological, historical and legal factors on one side, and 
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the capacity of the constitutor and the general constitutional engineering on the 
other side. The dilemma set by A. Bickel in the 1960s and which is based on the 
thesis that “when the Supreme Court declares the law or the act of the elected 
executive power as unconstitutional, it disables the will of the representatives of 
the citizens – it performs control not on the behalf of the majority, but against it“, 
will inspire Ackerman to look for the exit of the enchanted circle in the so-called 
constitutional dualism. His constitutional dualism is composed of the continuous 
policy in which the citizens are not included and are relatively unengaged, so the 
process of decision making is left to their representatives i.e. legislative body on 
the one side and the constitutional policy on the other side in which there is 
intensive mobilisation of the citizens since the result of it is creation of the higher 
law i.e. adoption of the new constitutional principles. According to him, the control 
by the court is not an undemocratic phenomenon, as many will explain it, but an 
institute which will guard the interests of the citizens as far as “We the people” are 
not being reengaged in the constitutional policy.  
Led by the above-mentioned we conclude that the American constitutional and 
legal theory from “The Federalist Papers” to the works of Bickel and Ackerman 
still faces the bitter feeling that there is something radically wrong with the judicial 
control of the constitutionality and that it violates the theory of separation of 
powers. This thesis still “tickles” the American legal doctrine, although the justify-
cation of the principle of separation of powers and its complete compatibility with 
the judicial control of the constitutionality is in the works of the “founding fathers”. 
2. “The Doctrinal Concept of Unconstitutionality of the Constitutional Law” – 
Transformation of the Courts into Guardians of the Constitution and 
Constitutional Values or Plunging into the “Hemingway’s Garden of Eden” 
 In terms of the constitutional and judicial literacy the view that the constitutional 
acts and the constitutional amendments may be subject to a review of the 
constitutionality is very interesting. It seems that the answer to this question 
directly affects the modelling of the concept of separation of powers. This is 
because the especially careful adoption of the modern concepts of the 
constitutional norms brings into question the manner of implementation of the 
classical concept of separation of powers in the system. Thus, one theoretical 
perspective defends the thesis that the constitutional acts and constitutional 
amendments, having in mind the fact that they regulate materia constitutionis and 
according to it have the same legal power with the constitution, cannot be subjected 
to a review of constitutionality. The abovementioned theoretical perspective rigidly 
keeps to Kelsen’s doctrine of levels in the law (Stuffentheorie) and provides for the 
possibility for a review of the constitutionality of the lower level legal norms 
compared to those of higher level. The above-mentioned is a theoretical basis for 
the traditional implementation of the constitutional and judicial control of the 
constitutionality of the legal acts. On the other hand, a wider theoretical perspective 
represents the thesis that in order to realise a protection of the established order in 
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the true sense of the word, the constitutional court can evaluate the constitutionality 
of both constitutional acts and constitutional amendments. The doctrinal concept of 
unconstitutionality of the constitutional law is based on the perspective that all 
legal norms can be subject to control of the constitutionality solely in order to 
protect the values and the principles which the constitution appreciates as 
fundamental. In modern times, the concept of “fundamental constitutionality” is 
also marked as “absolute entrenching” whose task is to provide protection of the 
“spirit of the constitution” . Kelsen’s perspective according to which the 
constitution may prohibit the laws to have certain contents, therefore the legislator 
cannot adopt a law, even a constitutional provision which would have such 
contents, is the theoretical basis for the above-mentioned modern doctrine in the 
constitutional and judicial literature. Thus, the prohibition on change of the form of 
government or the prohibition on change of the democratic order with 
constitutional laws directly binds the legislator and does not leave a space for 
manoeuvring and eventual adoption of constitutional acts or amendments which 
would be contrary to the above-mentioned prohibitions. The above-mentioned 
“eternity clauses” or “eternity guarantee” can be interpreted as a presumption for 
conducting the assessment of the material constitutionality of the legal acts, i.e. 
presumption for the so-called unconstitutionality of the constitutional norms.  
However, the doctrine of unconstitutionality of constitutional norms is primarily 
related to the review of the material constitutionality, not the formal one. Although 
the above-mentioned doctrinal concept (verfassungswidrigen Verfassungsrechts) 
has its origins in the Constitution of Norway from 1814, it has also been 
established and maintained as a practice of the Federal Constitutional Court in 
Germany. Nor the Basic Law nor the Federal Law on Constitutional Court contain 
provisions which expressis verbis provide authorisation to the Federal 
Constitutional Court to perform control of the constitutionality of the constitutional 
norms. The Federal Constitutional Court of Germany believes that the 
constitutional norms are subject to control of constitutionality solely because no 
constitutional norm should be out of the context and interpreted independently. 
Namely, in the explanation of the first decision from 1951 (Südweststaat-Streit), 
the Federal Court of Germany laid the foundations of the doctrine of 
unconstitutionality of the constitutional norms and emphasised that the individual 
constitutional provision cannot be isolated and interpreted individually because the 
constitution has internal unity and the importance of the single part is related to the 
importance of all other parts and the unity as general. There are constitutional 
principles which are basic and which are reflection of the law in such amount that 
they have an advantage over the constitution and also oblige the constitutor. Two 
years later, the doctrine was amended by the view that when one of the norms of 
the basic law will exceed the limits of the principles of fairness and over the 
positive law, the Federal Constitutional Court will be obliged to abolish this 
constitutional norm.  
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The doctrine of unconstitutionality of the constitutional norms was also established 
by the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic through its practice, although 
the Constitution does not explicitly provide for such power. The Constitutional 
Court put the constitutional acts category under the category of acts and estimated 
that they are also a subject to control of constitutionality. Namely, in 2009, the 
Court believed that the exclusion of the review of the constitutionality of the 
constitutional acts from the competence of the Constitutional Court would 
completely eliminate its role as guardian of the constitutionality.  
Finally, it must be pointed out that the implementation of this modern doctrinal 
concept represents powerful tool in the possession of the constitutional courts and 
for the use of which a capacity and so-called passive virtue are needed. The 
introduction of such practice hides the danger of transforming the constitutional 
courts into hidden constitutors and the possibility to practice enhanced judicial 
activism under the veil of the terms such as “symbolic constitution”, “living 
constitution” or “constitution behind the constitution”. Therefore, the implementta-
tion of this doctrinal concept by the constitutional courts implies well explained 
and elaborated decisions which will make evident the determination of the Court to 
preserve “the spirit of constitutionality” on the one hand, as well as consistent 
observance of the principle of separation of powers as powerful mechanism of the 
constitutionalism on the other hand.  
 
5.Conclusion 
The Constitutionalism is an ideal and ideology for limited and controlled 
government. The legal mechanisms, means and instruments which limit the power 
are the way to reach this ideal. The constitutionalism, as request for limited power 
with legal means, achieves this through the human rights principle – as external 
principle and the principle of separation of powers – as internal principle.  
The principle of separation of powers is a basic idea, general objective and a 
constant of the modern legal order. The principle of separation of powers which 
actually means that the legislative, executive and judicial power must be separated, 
is in service of another higher idea, i.e. disabling the arbitrariness of the 
government, obstruction of the unwanted concentration and misuse of powers, and 
finally and most importantly – preserving and securing the personal freedom of the 
individual.  
The principle of separation of powers should not be made absolute. In the 
contemporary political systems the principle is experiencing a kind of evolution. It 
seems that the principle of separation of powers modelled according to the ideas of 
Locke and Montesquieu was not immune to the modern trends of the 
constitutionalism. The feeling, that the principle loses part of the romantic and 
authentic feature, becomes stronger. It seems that the trends of equipoise of the 
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executive power according to the will of the citizens transposed into the legislator 
are more and more oriented towards the constitutional courts. Today the fear of 
“new separation of powers” which provided a possibility for secure positioning of 
the courts in the process of policy creation is more justifiable.  
“The new separation of powers” is advocated by the resent constitutionalism, so 
the juristocracy and the court activism are its features. The new separation of 
power, as new condition in the relations between the branches of the state power, 
essentially implies to a situation in which the courts determine or redefine the 
limits of actions by the other branches of the government on the behalf of the 
constitutional principles. The fear of "a brave new world”, which skilfully 
intertwines the judicial activism and judicial paramontcy vs. the citizen as a source 
of the political legitimacy, appears to be completely justified. The contemporary 
concept of the new separation of powers in the recent constitutionalism carries, like 
a shadow, the threat to transform the principle in its own opposite. The new 
separation of powers provides exceptional position of the courts in the system of 
organisation of powers. The abovementioned positioning has not been expressis 
verbis constitutionally established, its roots are in the practice of decision making 
which the courts foster and through which they are actively included in the process 
of policies making. In seems that the interpretation of the “mischievous phrases” of 
the constitution, by introducing concepts for ,,symbolic constitution” and 
,,constitution behind a constitution” on one hand, and the introduction of the 
doctrine for review of the constitutionality of the constitutional norms on other, 
overhangs the concept of separation of powers as The Sword of Leviathan.  
Finally, the dilemma whether “the New Separation of Powers”, as an element of 
the constitutionalism, is ,,The new garden of Eden” or “The dark side of the moon” 
remains open. 
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Summary 
 
The Features of the Modern Concept of Separation of Powers as an Element 
of Constitutionalism- “The Garden of Eden” or 
“The Dark Side of the Moon”? 
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“Ss. Cyril and Methodius” University, Skopje, Republic of Macedonia 
 
 
The focus of the contemporary constitutional law and the constitutionalism is the limitation 
of the government by the means of legal instruments and mechanisms. Therefore, the 
analysis of the relation between the concept of constitutionalism and the principle of 
separation of powers has the central position of this paper. The paper elaborates the concept 
of constitutionalism as an idea and ideology of limited and controlled power. At the same 
time it has been emphasised that the development of the constitutionalism as a doctrine is 
possible only with previous analysis of its basic elements. The principle of "separation of 
powers" is one of these elements. The second point of this paper refers to the principle of 
“separation of powers” as one of the basic principles and concepts of the contemporary 
constitutions. The principle of separation of powers is a basic idea, general objective and a 
constant of the contemporary legal order. However, the paper will point out that the new 
situation in the relations between the branches of the government and the adaptation of the 
principle of separation of powers to the new circumstances, in the constitutional literature is 
known as contemporary constitutionalism. The paper elaborates the concepts of judicial 
supremacy and judicial paramontcy as elements of the contemporary American 
constitutionalism, as well as the manners and attempts for their theoretical justification. On 
the other hand, the paper will elaborate the phenomenon of judicial juristocracy in the 
European continental systems for control of constitutionality. The paper highlights the 
implementation of the doctrine of review of the constitutionality of the constitutional norms 
(verfassungswidrigen Verfassungsrechts) in the practice of the European constitutional 
courts. It elaborates the dilemma does the interpretation of the “mischievous phrases” of the 
constitution, by introducing concepts for ,,symbolic constitution” and ,,constitution behind 
a constitution” on one hand, and the introduction of the doctrine of review of the 
constitutionality of the constitutional norms on other, overhangs the concept of separation 
of powers, as The Sword of Leviathan.  
Finally the paper sets the dilemma whether the tectonic shift of the focus of decision making 
towards the legislative – executive – judicial power, and the unhidden and manifested will, 
ambition and activity of the courts to control the action of political authorities as a feature 
of the contemporary constitutionalism, is the so-called “the garden of Eden” or its opposite 
“the Dark Side of the Moon”.  
Keywords: Constitutionalism, Separation of powers, Juristocracy, Judicial paramountcy, 
Judicial activism, Judicial supremacy, Symbolic constitution, Constitution behind the 
constitution. 
